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Abstract
Waterfowl and shorebirds harbor and shed all hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtypes of influenza A viruses and
interact in nature with a broad range of other avian and mammalian species to which they might transmit such viruses.
Estimating the efficiency and importance of such cross-species transmission using epidemiological approaches is difficult.
We therefore addressed this question by studying transmission of low pathogenic H5 and H7 viruses from infected ducks to
other common animals in a quasi-natural laboratory environment designed to mimic a common barnyard. Mallards (Anas
platyrhynchos) recently infected with H5N2 or H7N3 viruses were introduced into a room housing other mallards plus
chickens, blackbirds, rats and pigeons, and transmission was assessed by monitoring virus shedding (ducks) or
seroconversion (other species) over the following 4 weeks. Additional animals of each species were directly inoculated with
virus to characterize the effect of a known exposure. In both barnyard experiments, virus accumulated to high titers in the
shared water pool. The H5N2 virus was transmitted from infected ducks to other ducks and chickens in the room either
directly or through environmental contamination, but not to rats or blackbirds. Ducks infected with the H7N2 virus
transmitted directly or indirectly to all other species present. Chickens and blackbirds directly inoculated with these viruses
shed significant amounts of virus and seroconverted; rats and pigeons developed antiviral antibodies, but, except for one
pigeon, failed to shed virus.
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Introduction
Gaining a more detailed understanding of the transmission
potential of different avian influenza viruses (AIVs) among co-
habitating species will enhance our ability to develop accurate
models for disease spread, develop control strategies and, in some
cases, assess risk of transmission to humans. Influenza A viruses are
a common concern among many animal species including, birds,
horses, pigs, sea mammals and humans, as the effects can range
from asymptomatic to severe respiratory distress leading to death.
While AIVs are maintained in wild water birds, they occasionally
spread to other animals and humans and can lead to public health
concerns, as currently is the case for highly pathogenic H5N1
viruses. All 16 hemagglutinin (HA) and 9 neuraminidase (NA)
subtypes of influenza A virus are found in wild waterfowl, gulls,
and shorebirds [1,2,3], but a much more restricted subset of these
viruses is found in other birds and mammals.
Most strains of AIV are designated low pathogenic (LP) and
cause minimal illness in chickens, as well as in wild waterfowl and
shorebirds, but infection results in high levels of virus shedding,
efficient spread among susceptible hosts, and perpetuation of the
agent. Other AIV strains are classified as highly pathogenic (HP)
and are restricted to members of the H5 and H7 subtype. HPAIV
classification comes from the ability to cause severe morbidity and
mortality in domestic fowl and more recently has caused mortality
in wild waterfowl, mammals, and humans [4,5]. In several
outbreaks of HPAIV, circulation of a H5 or H7 LPAIV was
detected shortly before the HPAIV outbreak of same subtype, and
was determined to have evolved from the LPAIV strain either
through a recombination event [6,7] or a gradual increase in
virulence over time through the insertion or substitution of basic
amino acids at the HA cleavage site [8,9].
Among water birds, mallards are of great interest due to their
widespread distribution, reservoir for subtypes H1–H12, and
ability to shed large amounts of virus with minimal pathology and
disease [10,11]. Mallards can also travel large distances and have
been implicated as carriers of AIVs from one region to another
[12,13]. In mallards, it has been shown that the minimum
duration of shedding decreases over a season of sampling among
individual birds, and is likely due to transient immunity [14], but
with limited data on actual strains causing infection, the concern
remains that while infection and shedding continue to occur, the
ability of LPAIV to mutate or evolve into HPAIV remains.
Furthermore, some HP H5N1 viruses are non-pathogenic in
mallards [11] or can become non-pathogenic through evolution-
ary adaptation in the duck host while remaining highly pathogenic
to other domestic poultry. This would allow for the possibility of
ducks transmitting the virus to other poultry without themselves
suffering disease [15].
The relative roles of direct contact versus environmental
contamination in the transmission of AIVs remains poorly
understood; both mechanisms likely occur based on experimental
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and field studies [16,17,18,19]. Understanding routes of transmis-
sion is important to modeling spread of virus [20,21,22]. AIVs
have been shown to persist in water sources [23,24] and may
provide a source of contamination to other species sharing the
same source. It has also been shown that over a 4 year period in
Hong Kong, virus was isolated throughout the year from domestic
ducks [25].
Common concerns with transmission of AIV from waterfowl to
other species are evident when you observe interactions of multiple
species, both domestic and wild, present within a single small farm,
virtually anywhere in the world. Transmission to species such as
rodents would not likely result in disease spread, but could be
exploited to monitor disease incursion via serosurveillance; rats
and mice are found in abundance on small farms and are of
concern in their ability to move freely from outside into enclosures,
and their propensity to eat and drink from common containers of
poultry feed. Although rats are not considered reservoir hosts for
influenza viruses, both laboratory and cotton rats have been shown
to replicate unadapted avian and human influenza A viruses
[26,27,28]. Similarly, pigeons are not generally considered an
important host for transmission of influenza viruses, but are
ubiquitous on small farms and undoubtedly exposed to these
viruses on a routine basis. Their susceptibility to experimental
infection with both LPAIV or HPAIV has been variable
[29,30,31,32].
It is clear that wild and domestic ducks harbor and shed
influenza A viruses and recurrently interact in nature with a broad
range of other avian and mammalian species to which they might
transmit such viruses. Estimating the efficiency and importance of
such multispecies transmission using epidemiological approaches is
difficult. We therefore addressed this question by studying
transmission of LP H5 and H7 viruses from infected ducks to
other common animals in a quasi-natural laboratory environment
designed to mimic a common barnyard.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All experiments were approved by the Institutional Animal Care
and Use Committee of Colorado State University, Fort Collins,
Colorado, USA, under approval number 09-168A.
Animals
Mallard ducks and chickens were purchased from local
producers at 2–4 months and 3–4 weeks of age respectively.
Red-winged blackbirds and pigeons were captured locally.
Sprague Dawley rats, 6–8 weeks of age were obtained from
Charles River Laboratories. All animals tested negative for group-
specific antibodies to influenza A virus by ELISA and strain
specific antibodies (H5 and H7; ,10) by hemagglutination
inhibition (HAI) assay prior to infection.
Viruses, Virus Assays and Serologic Assays
The viruses used in this study were A/Mallard/MN/346250/
00 (H5N2) and A/Ruddy turnstone/ReedsBeachNJ/00 (H7N3).
Both viruses were propagated to passage three in 10 day old
specific pathogen free embryonated chicken eggs (Sunrise Farms,
NY). Eggs were incubated at 37 C and allantoic fluid was
harvested 48 hours after inoculation, aliquoted, and stored at
280 C until use. Both viruses were titrated by plaque assay.
Briefly, plaque assays were performed on monolayers of MDCK
cells (ATCC, Manassas, VA) in 6-well plates. The monolayers
were washed with PBS, inoculated with sample, incubated
60 minutes at 37 C, then overlaid with 0.5% agarose in minimal
essential medium containing 0.5% bovine albumin, antibiotics
and TPCK trypsin (1 mg/ml). Following a 48 hour incubation at
37 C, a second overlay containing neutral red (33 mg/L) was
applied and plaques were visualized and counted 4–6 hours
later.
The challenge virus for each experiment was used to determine
subtype-specific antibodies using the hemagglutination-inhibition
assay [33], using sera treated with receptor destroying enzyme
(Denka Seiken, Tokyo, Japan) as previously described [34]. Serial
2-fold dilutions of sera in PBS were prepared in 96-well V-bottom
plates and mixed with 0.5% chicken red blood cells; titers of 10 or
greater were considered positive. Group specific antibodies were
detected using a commercial cELISA test (Flu DETECTH BE,
Synbiotics Corporation, Kansas City, MO) based on detection of
antibodies to a recombinant AIV nucleoprotein antigen. Exper-
iments were carried out following the manufacturer’s instructions.
The manufacturer has validated this assay utilizing both chicken
and duck sera.
Barnyard Transmission Experiment
Two independent experiments were conducted using different
influenza viruses. In the first experiment, the barnyard contained 8
ducks, 8 chickens, 8 rats and 10 blackbirds. The second
experiment consisted of 8 ducks, 8 chickens, 6 pigeons, 5
blackbirds and 7 rats. In both experiments, animals were allowed
to freely range inside a room within an ABSL3 facility. The room
had dimensions of 12 (width)618 (length)612 (height) feet and
basic illumination was provided through a skylight in the roof. The
barnyard rooms contained a plastic children’s swimming pool
(4 feet diameter, cut to 6 inches height) and two large bowls that
contained commercial duck and chicken layer feed (Figure 1A).
Three smaller bowls filled with songbird mixed grains were
suspended approximately 6 feet off the floor from pipes that ran
longitudinally across the room; these pipes also served as perches
for the blackbirds and pigeons. Straw was spread across the floor
sparsely and a sawhorse was present to provide additional
perching opportunities for blackbirds and pigeons. Two or three
cardboard boxes were provided as nest boxes for the rats. The
pool was filled daily (but not emptied within the first week of the
trial) with 5 gallons of water that had been sitting at room
temperature and aerated with an aquarium pump for 24 hours to
dechlorinate and thus prevent inactivation of any influenza virus
[35]. This was also done to better mimic the natural state of water
such as lakes and streams and farm water, which are typically not
chlorinated. In the first experiment, night vision (infrared) cameras
were installed in the room to allow monitoring of behaviors in the
dark (Figure 1B).
On day 0 of each experiment, four ducks were removed from
the barnyard room, placed in a separate room, and inoculated
orally, intranasally and ocularly with 106 PFU/0.5 ml of the
respective virus. After four hours, the four inoculated ducks were
returned to the barnyard where all animals were free to move
about the room and interact. All eight ducks (4 inoculated and 4
non-inoculated) were sampled on days 0–7 by collecting oral and
cloacal swabs into 2 ml BA-1 medium (MEM, 1% bovine serum
albumin, 350 mg/L sodium bicarbonate, 50 ml/L 1 M Tris,
pH7.6, 5 mg/L phenol red) supplemented with antibiotics
(gentamicin 50 ug/ml, polymyxin B 100 U/ml, nyastatin 50 U/
ml, penicillin, 100 U/ml and streptomycin 50 ug/ml), refrigerated
and tested within 2 days for virus titer by plaque assay on MDCK
cells; titers are reported as PFU/ml. The only barnyard animals to
have daily swab samples collected for virus titration were ducks as
we wished to minimize the stress on remaining barnyard species
and use seroconversion as the determination of virus infection. All
AIV Transmission in an Artificial Barnyard
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animals in the barnyard room were bled on days 0, 14, 21 and 28,
and those sera were tested for seroconversion using HAI and
ELISA.
Two to three water samples were collected daily before the
addition of new water. Samples were collected by skimming the
top of the pool with a tube, sediment by running the tube along the
bottom of the pool to collect sample, and, if present, taking a
sample of splashed water from the floor near the pool. To assist in
interpreting pool water virus titers, we conducted an in vitro
experiment in which pool water from a room containing non-
infected ducks was spiked with the H5 or H7 viruses, maintained
at room temperature and tested by plaque assay, as described
above, at intervals up to 42 days.
Direct Inoculation of Control Animals
For both experiments, groups of each of the animals in the
barnyard except ducks were housed in cages in a separate room
and directly inoculated with virus to determine the effects of
known exposure. Chickens, pigeons, blackbirds and rats were
inoculated intranasally with 106 PFU in 0.1 ml. Once daily on
days 0–7, oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were collected from
the birds, and oral swabs from rats; these samples were processed
as described above for duck samples. Sera were collected on days
0, 14, 21, and 28, and tested for anti-influenza antibodies by
ELISA and for challenge virus-specific antibodies by HAI.
In vitro detection of virus
Water was collected from a pool that had non infected ducks
swimming in it for 24 hours prior to water collection. This was
done to mimic the natural state of the water from the barnyard
study where water would also contain feces and food particles.
Pool water was then placed in a 50 ml conical tube and spiked
with either 16106 PFU/ml of H5N2 or H7N3 virus and placed at
room temperature. A tube of the same water not spiked with virus
served as the negative control and was collected and tested for
virus. Samples were collected once daily on days 0 through 7 then
weekly for 6 weeks. One ml aliquots were collected at each time
point and stored at 280 until all samples were collected. Samples
were then tested for virus titer utilizing the plaque assay.
Results
Clinical signs of disease were not observed in any of the birds or
rats in the barnyard environments nor among those caged and
directly inoculated with either virus. Animals in the barnyard were
observed several times daily. The ducks and chickens tended to
cluster and move about in their own groups. Blackbirds and
pigeons spent much of their time perched above the floor, but
were frequently observed walking on the floor or perched on the
side of the pool. All of the birds and rats were observed drinking
from the pool and eating out of common feed bowls on the floor.
The rats were almost never seen out of their houses during
daylight, but were confirmed by video to be exceptionally active in
running around the room and through the pool of water during
the dark (Figure 1B).
Infection and Transmission: H5N2 virus
Virus was shed by all four inoculated ducks and transmitted to
all four contact ducks either through direct contact or environ-
mental contamination of the floor and shared pool (Table 1). As
would be expected with LPAIV in ducks, virus was shed to higher
titers by the cloacal versus oral routes. Contact ducks did not begin
shedding detectable virus until at least 1 day after inoculated ducks
began shedding. Detectable shedding of virus from ducks ended on
day 5 post inoculation. H5N2 virus was first detectable in sampled
water on day 2 post inoculation and continued until day 7 which
was the last day samples were collected before the pool was
emptied completely and refilled (Figure 2A). Titers of virus were
comparable in all three samples on each day except the floor
sample from day four was 100-fold greater than either the
sediment or surface pool water sample, likely due to a
concentration of feces in that area on that day. In vitro testing of
H5N2 virus stability in pool water demonstrated a steady decline
in virus titer with viable virus detected out to day 35 (Figure 3).
In the direct inoculation of control animals experiment, 83% of
chickens and 100% of blackbirds shed detectable virus orally on
days 1 through 5 and 1 through 6 respectively (Table 2); small
amounts of virus were detected sporadically on cloacal swabs from
one chicken on day 4. Virus was not recovered from rats or
pigeons that were directly inoculated with virus.
In order to determine infection rates of all animals exposed in
the barnyard or directly inoculated, sera were collected on days 0,
14, 21 and 28 post-inoculation or exposure.
For the contact chickens in the barnyard we observed
seroconversion rates in chickens of 63% by HAI and 100% by
ELISA (Table 3). None of the barnyard contact rats and
blackbirds seroconverted by either HAI or ELISA. For the
directly inoculated control animals, there was 100% seroconver-
sion in the chickens and rats by both HAI and ELISA but only
50% (1/2) in the blackbirds by HAI (Table 3). The ELISA failed
Figure 1. Barnyard room layout observed during the day (A)
and at night (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017643.g001
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to detect antibody in any blackbird, regardless of HAI titer or virus
isolation. One caveat to the experiment with the blackbirds is that
repeated daily handling to obtain the cloacal and oral swabs
proved too stressful and 3 of the 6 blackbirds died due to non-
influenza complications before serum collection was initiated on
day 7.
Infection and Transmission: H7N3 Virus
Virus was shed by all four inoculated ducks and transmitted to
all four contact ducks (Table 1). Virus was shed longer and to
slightly higher titers than with the H5N2 virus isolate which was
only detectable to day 5. Virus titers from oral samples were also
higher than oral viral titers seen in the H5N2 experiment. As seen
with the H5N2 experiment, contact ducks did not shed detectable
virus until at least one day after inoculated ducks began shedding,
as would be expected in cases of transmission (Table 1). Virus
shedding was detected in at least one duck on all days 1 through 7.
For the H7N3 experiment we extended the number of days of
water sample collection from 7 days to 9 before cleaning out the
pool. H7N3 virus was detected in samples from day 1 through day
9, with floor samples showing the highest levels of virus at all time
points. (Figure 2B) H7N3 virus was also tested in vitro for stability,
and behaved similarly to the H5N2 virus with viable virus detected
out to day 42 (Figure 3).
Virus isolation was also performed on all control animals
directly inoculated with H7N3 virus, including blackbirds,
pigeons, chickens and rats. Virus was isolated from oropharygeal
swabs at various time points from 83% of chickens, 16% of
pigeons, and 100% of blackbirds (Table 2), but was not isolated
from any of the oral swabs collected from rats.
Table 1. Virus shedding from inoculated and contact ducks.
Virus titer in swab sample (log10 PFU/ml)
Virus Exposure Sample* Duck 11 2 3 4 5 6 7
H5N2 Inoculated CLO 2 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 1.0 2.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
3 ,1.0 4.7 2.8 1.5 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
4 ,1.0 3.0 3.6 3.1 2.9 ,1.0 ,1.0
6 ,1.0 5.9 3.8 3.0 2.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
OP 2 ,1.0 1.3 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
3 2.3 1.3 ,1.0 1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
4 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 2.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
6 ,1.0 1.0 ,1.0 1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
Contact CLO 1 ,1.0 ,1.0 3.1 4.6 3.1 ,1.0 ,1.0
5 ,1.0 ,1.0 4.6 3.3 2.7 ,1.0 ,1.0
7 ,1.0 ,1.0 4.1 3.9 3.3 ,1.0 ,1.0
8 ,1.0 ,1.0 3.0 4.3 2.9 ,1.0 ,1.0
OP 1 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
5 ,1.0 ,1.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 ,1.0 ,1.0
7 ,1.0 1.5 1.8 2.3 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
8 ,1.0 ,1.0 1.5 ,1.0 1.8 ,1.0 ,1.0
H7N2 Inoculated CLO 1 ,1.0 4.4 3.7 2.5 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
2 3.3 3.5 3.0 2.9 1.0 1.6 ,1.0
3 2.3 3.5 3.0 2.5 1.3 ,1.0 ,1.0
7 ,1.0 3.5 2.9 3.3 2.3 ,1.0 ,1.0
OP 1 1.3 3.0 1.5 2.4 1.7 2.3 ,1.0
2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.9 1.3 1.0 ,1.0
3 1.0 ,1.0 1.0 3.3 1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
7 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.9 1.7 ,1.0 ,1.0
Contact CLO 4 ,1.0 2.6 3.6 3.3 ,1.0 ,1.0 ,1.0
5 ,1.0 3.3 3.0 3.6 2.0 ,1.0 1.0
6 ,1.0 4.6 3.7 2.0 3.7 1.0 ,1.0
8 ,1.0 6.3 6.5 3.5 3.7 1.0 ,1.0
OP 4 ,1.0 2.5 1.8 1.6 2.5 ,1.0 ,1.0
5 ,1.0 1.0 2.0 1.6 1.5 ,1.0 ,1.0
6 ,1.0 2.3 2.0 ,1.0 1.3 ,1.0 ,1.0
8 ,1.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.9 ,1.0 ,1.0
*Swab samples are cloacal (CLO) or oropharygeal (OP).
1Numbers represent days post challenge.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017643.t001
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Transmission rates in the barnyard were assessed serologically
on days 0, 14, 21 and 28 post inoculation. Only 25% of virus-
inoculated ducks seroconverted based on HAI results but 100%
were positive by ELISA, correlating with the fact that 100% shed
virus to varying degrees in the experiment (Table 3). Of the four
contact ducks, 50% seroconverted by HAI and 100% by ELISA.
Also in the barnyard, contact chickens, rats, blackbirds, and
pigeons seroconverted at 100%, 0%, 80%, and 0% respectively as
detected by HAI and 100%, 86%, 0%, and 83% by ELISA
(Table 3).
For the directly inoculated chickens, rats, blackbirds, and
pigeons we observed seroconversion rates of 67%, 80%, 100%,
and 0% by HAI respectively, and 100%, 100%, 0%, and 33% by
ELISA respectively (Table 3). As with the H5N2, the experimen-
tally infected blackbirds did not all survive to day 7 for serum
collection so the percentage represents only one of the original four
blackbirds that survived to the end of day 21 (Table 3).
Discussion
In both barnyard experiments, introduction of recently-infected
mallards was followed rapidly by infection and shedding of virus
by contact ducks, and accumulation of substantial quantities of
virus in water from the shared pool. Based on detection of
seroconversion, ducks infected with either virus efficiently
transmitted the virus to other species either through direct contact,
which would be most likely with the contact ducks, or through
contamination of the environment such as the pool and floor water
where high virus titers were recovered in titers high enough to
infect the other species. The H7N3 virus was transmitted to a large
fraction of other animals in the room, including blackbirds,
pigeons and rats, but transmission of the H5N2 virus to blackbirds
and rats was not detected. This apparent difference in cross-species
transmission may reflect, in part, differences in transmissibility
between the two viruses, but it is more likely that transmission of
the H7 virus was enhanced due to its higher magnitude and
duration of shedding, and higher levels of accumulation in the
shared water source compared to that of the H5 virus. As
anticipated, neither of the two viruses induced noticeable signs of
disease in any of the exposed animals, including those directly
inoculated with virus.
The high titers of virus that accumulated in water of the shared
barnyard pools undoubtedly were in excess of what might typically
be expected in natural situations involving wild mallards, but may
not be altogether unrealistic for low pathogenic AIVs in small
bodies of water. Moreover, it seems likely that such titers may
occur in ponds associated with high density domestic duck
production facilities, although studies attempting to measure virus
titers in such situations are lacking with ducks. The presence of
environmental AIV in water habitats of turkeys supports the need
for increased environmental sampling along with avian surveil-
lance studies [17]. It is evident however, from this and other
experimental studies, that efficient transmission via contaminated
water can occur among ducks and between ducks and other birds
[19,36].
Rats were included in the barnyard transmission experiments
because they or other rodents are inevitably present on small
farms, sometimes in large numbers, are in direct contact with
ducks and poultry and are able to move freely among enclosures.
Live markets in Asia, where H5N1 influenza is prevalent, are an
additional setting where large numbers of rats live in close contact
with ducks and chickens [28]. The role of rodents in facilitating
spread of AIVs is essentially unknown. Rats housed in the H7N3
contaminated barnyard room seroconverted to that virus, as did
caged rats inoculated with both H5N2 and H7N2 viruses.
Shedding of neither virus from infected rats was detected,
supporting the idea that they do not play a significant role in
transmission to other species.
Sero-surveys in natural settings [37,38,39] as well as in
experimental studies [40] have provided valuable insights into
the infection rates of mallards and other wild birds. In the current
study, seroconversion was used to evaluate virus transmission
among the barnyard animals and to assess infection in the animals
directly inoculated with virus; further, it would have been
Figure 2. Accumulation of H5N2 (A) and H7N3 (B) viruses in
barnyard pool water. Water samples skimmed from the surface of
the pool, off the bottom (sediment-rich) or splashed onto the floor were
assayed for infectious virus by plaque assay on MDCK cells.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017643.g002
Figure 3. Survival of H5N2 and H7N3 viruses added to duck
pool water and maintained at ambient temperature. Water from
a pool used by non-infected ducks was spiked with virus, sampled over
time and assayed by plaque assay on MDCK cells.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017643.g003
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extremely stressful to capture the blackbirds and pigeons daily to
obtain samples for virus isolation. Results obtained from the
nucleoprotein blocking ELISA more accurately reflected the
results of virus isolation and known virus exposure than did the
HAI test, and allowed detection of virus transmission to rats and
pigeons in the H7 barnyard trial. An interesting exception to this
finding was that the ELISA consistently failed to detect antibodies
to either influenza virus in blackbird sera despite their being
positive by HAI testing. Results reported here suggest that multiple
serologic tests are necessary to accurately conduct serosurveillance
for influenza viruses when diverse species are involved. Additional
research to identify factors responsible for these serologic
discrepancies would clearly be beneficial to surveillance efforts
and allow an enhanced understanding of the ecology and
evolution of AIVs worldwide.
Both LPAIVs tested efficiently spread from ducks to chickens
within the shared environment, and a majority of chickens directly
inoculated with these viruses shed them at reasonable levels from
the intestinal tract; we did not test whether chicken-to-chicken
transmission occurred. Transmission of LPAIV from ducks to
chickens, if accompanied by mutations in the hemagglutinin gene
encoding the HA-1:HA-2 cleavage site, could lead to generation of
a HPAIV and subsequent outbreak in poultry. It is not known
whether either of these viruses replicating in chickens, blackbirds,
or pigeons might evolve and adapt to those hosts, allowing the new
host to better transmit the virus or whether the virus would
encounter a dead end in the new host.
Small farms, live and wet markets, and many poultry shows
provide abundant opportunities for interactions among free
ranging and domestic species which may result in transmission
and perpetuation of AIVs, particularly when ducks are involved.
The studies reported here indicate that introduction of ducks
infected with LPAIV into a room designed to mimic a typical
barnyard resulted in efficient dissemination of virus to a number of
other species, including other birds and rodents. This model
system should be extended to investigate more refined questions,
such as transmission from passerines to ducks or chickens,
multiround transmission, and transmission involving additional
viruses, including H5N1 AIV.
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